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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
PACIFIC METALS COMPANY,
DIVISION OF A. M. CASTLE
& COMP ANY, a Corporation,

Ylaintif f and Respondent,
VS.

TRACY-COLLINS BANK AND
TRUST COMPANY, a Corpo,ration,

Defendant and Third Party
Plaintiff, and Appellant,

and
BANK OF SALT LAKE,

Defendant and
Cross-Plairvtiff,

Civil No.
11083

vs.
TRACY-COLLINS BANK AND
TRUST COMP ANY, a Corporation,

Defendant and Third Party
Plciintiff, and Appellant,

vs.
OLYMPUS HEATING AND AIR
CONDITIONING, a Corporation

Third-Party Defendant.

MOTION FOR RE-HEARING BY TRACYCOLLINS BANK AND TRUST COMPANY
AND BRIEF
COMES NO"\V the Appellant TRACY-COLLINS BANK AND TRUST COMPANY (hereinafter ref erred to as TracyCollins) and moves the
Comt for a re-hearing in the above entitled case for
the following reasons :
1. The Court erred in ordering TRACY-COLLINS BANK AND TRUST COMPANY to pay the
BANK OF SALT LAKE'S cost on appeal.
1

2. (a) That the Court's decision is based on an
a p p a r e n t misunderstanding of the Appellant
TRACY-COLLINS' p o s i ti o n, in stating that
TRACY-COLLINS maintained that PAC IF IC
METALS COMPANY, Division of A. M. Castle &
Company, hereinafter referred to as PACIFIC
METALS, had no basis for recovery because it did
not give any consideration to MAYNE PLUMBING
for MAYNE PL UMBING's placing P A C I FI C
METALS' name on the check as co-payee with
OLYMPUS, and we respectfully submit that such
misunderstanding accounts for its failure to consider the controlling issues raised by the appeal, namely, what damages in conversion, if any, is a nonendorsing co-payee entitled to where it owns none
of the funds represented by the check and is a general creditor of the endorsing co-payee, or owns only
a fractional interest therein, or where its interest
in the funds represented by the check is to be determined by future negotiation between the co-payee,
and
( b) The Court erred in holding that a collecting
or drawee bank has an absolute liability for the face
amount of the check to a non-endorsing co-payee
in conversion, even though the non-endorsing co·
payee owned no interest in the funds represented
by the check or where it owned only a fractional
interest in said funds, or where the amount that
each co-payee was to receive would be determined,
after delivery, by subsequent negotiation between
the co-payees.
DATED this 21st day of November, 1968.
FRED L. FINLINSON,
L. DELOS DAINES
Attorneys for the Appellant
Tracy-Collins Bank & Trust Co.
822 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City Utah 84101
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APPELLANT'S BRIEF
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RE-HEARING
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN ORDERING TRACYCOLLINS BANK AND TRUST COMPANY TO
PAY THE BANK OF SALT LAKE'S COST ON
APPEAL.

The Appellant TRACY-COLLINS did not complain, on appeal, against the Bank of Salt Lake, nor
did the Bank of Salt Lake complain against the
Appellant TRACY-COLLINS. As far as the Bank
of Salt Lake was concerned, TRACY-COLLINS
abandoned its appeal, and this is plain, under the
heading ''Relief Sought on Appeal", App e 11 ant
TRACY-COLLINS stated that it sought relief from
the Summary Judgment of PACIFIC METALS
COMP ANY and Order denying its Motion for Summary Judgment against PACIFIC METALS( as
follows: "The Appellant TRACY-COLLINS seeks
to reverse Plaintiff's Summary Judgment, a reversal of the Judgment denying the Defendant TRACYCOLLINS' Motion for Summary Judgment against
the Plaintiff PACIFIC METALS COMPANY and
an Order directing the District Court to enter Judgment in favor of the Defendant TRACY-COLLINS
and against the Plaintiff PACIFIC METALS COMPANY" (Brief, page 4)
As there was no issue before this Court between
TRACY-COLLINS and the BANK OF SALT
3

LAKE, Appellant TRACY-COLLINS did not devote a single word to the BANK OF SALT LAKE
nor did the BANK OF SALT LAKE devote a single
word in its brief to its relationship with TRACYCOLLINS in this matter. Since Appellant had abandoned its appeal against the BANK OF SALT
LAKE, it would not have been before the Court,
except for PACIFIC METALS bringing it in on
cross-appeal.
J

In fact, that portion of the Court's Opinion regarding the relationship of TRACY-COLLINS and
the BANK OF SALT LAKE was an excursion into
an area not before it.
In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted that TRACY-COLLINS should be relieved
of the Judgment as to costs in favor of the BANK
OF SALT LAKE and that portion of PACIFIC
METALS COMPANY's costs related to its appeal
against the Bank of Salt Lake.
POINT II
WE WILL DISCUSS UNDER POINT II BOTH
NO. 2 (a) AND (b) OF TRACY-COLLINS'
GROUNDS FOR A MOTION FOR RE-HEARING.

The Court apparently misunderstood the posi·
tion of Tracy-Collins and failed to determine the
controlling issues raised by its appeal.
Tracy-Collins did not maintain, as the Court
said it did, that, because Pacific Metals' name was
included on the check as a courtesy and there was no
4

consideration running from Pacific Metals to Mayne
Plumbing, Pacific Metals had no basis on which to
recover.
The Court incorrectly stated Tracy-Collins'
position, when it said:
"In order to avoid liability to Plaintiff
Pacific Metals, Tracy-Collins contends that
the general contactor, Mayne Plumbing, included Pacific Metals as a joint payee on the
check only as an act of courtesy for which1t
is not shown that any consideration was given,
and that consequently Pacific Metals has no
interest thereon upon which to base its claim
for recovery. The contention is without merit."
Tracy-Collins' position was simply this: 'That,
as Pacific Metals did not have any interest or ownership in the proceeds of the check, it could not recover
against Tracy-Collins, or, if it could recover, such
recovery should be limited to the extent of Pacific
Metals' interest in the funds represented by the
check, and that, because Olympus Heating & Air
Conditioning, a corporation, hereinafter referred
to as Olympus, had received all of the funds represented by the check and since Pacific Metals' interest, if any, was to be determined by future negotiation, the agreement as to ownership was void for
uncertainty, and that, if the agreement was not void
for uncertainty, the question of Pacific Metals' interest was a question of fact to be determined by the
trial court.
5

In this respect, we call the Court's attention to
pages 15, 16 and 19 of our brief. On pages 15 and
16 we said:
"For Plaintiff to recover against Tracy
it must establish that it owned the check o{
proceeds thereof, and if not, then it has no
right of action against this Defendant and
its recourse is against Olympus for the agreed
value of the materials supplied: American
National Bank vs. First National Bank, 277
Pac. 2nd 951, 130 Colo. 557 (1954); Hi-Way
Motor Co. vs. Service Motor Co., 68 Utah 65,
249, Pac. 133; Mullner vs. McCromic & Co.,
Banker, 69 Utah 557, 257 Pac. 658."
It appears to Tracy-Collins that the Court proceeding on this a p p a r e n t misunderstanding of
Tracy-Collins' position may account for its failure
to consider the con trolling issues in the case which,
it is respectfully submitted, are: ( 1) What damages in conversion, if any, is a non-endorsing copayee entitled to, where it owns none of the funds
represented by the check and is only a general creditor of the endorsing co-payee, or owns only a fractional interest therein, or where its interest in the
funds represented by the check is to be determined
by future negotiation between the co-payees, after
delivery of the check, where the conversion results
from a mistake or unintentional act; (2) Is an
agreement void for uncertainty where the co-payees'
interests in the funds represented by the check are
to be determined by future negotiations between the
co-payees after delivery of the check?
6

The decision not only lays down a rule contrary
to that of other Courts which have considered the
problem, but changes its own rule of damages for
conversion, it opens the door to possibilities of fraud
and collusion, namely that both a collecting Bank
and a drawee Bank or either of them it liable, in
conversion, to a non-endorsing payee for the face
amount of the check, irrespective of the extent of its
interest or ownership of the funds represented by
the check. That is, for example, even though a nonendorsing payee had only a $100.00 interest in a
$10,000.00 check, it is nevertheless entitled to collect the face amount of check against either the collecting Bank or the Drawee Bank if the check is
honored without its endorsement. This is the Court's
ruling, and for this it will be cited. In setting out
the facts as the basis of the Opinion, the Court recognized that Pacific Metals did not own all of the
funds represented by the check, stating in its Opinion that after the checks were issued by Mayne
Plumbing payable to Olympus and Pacific Metals
as co-payees, they then divided the proceeds according to their respective interest therein. The Court
said:
'Thenceforward the practice was followed of issuing the checks in that form, both
payees endorsed the checks and divided the
proceeds according to their respective interest
therein." (Under-scoring added)
While we do not agree with the Court's statement "that they divided the proceeds according to
7

their respective interest therein", because the div].
sion was effected by negotiation after the checks
were issued and delivered, however, since it makes
no difference in so far as this motion is concerned
'
we will assume, for the purpose of this argument,
that the Court stated the facts correctly in this re·
gard. The important fact, we submit, which the
Court recognized, was that Pacific Metals did not
own all of the funds represented by the check.
In view of the fact that the Court recognized
and held that Pacific Metals did not own a 100 per
cent interest in the funds represented by the check,
how can a ruling be justified that the non-endorsing payee may recover the face amount of the check!
Whether the Court intended to or not, it laid
down a rule of absolute liability, holding that a nonendorsing payee may recover the face amount of the
check, irrespective of his interest therein. In this
respect, we direct the Court's attention to paragraph
4 and 5 of its Opinion.
The rule, announced by other Courts, is that a
non-endorsing payee's right of recovery, in conver·
sion, is limited to its interest or ownership in the
funds represented by the check, after its negotiabil·
ity had been destroyed.
There is another supposition that appears to
have led the Court into error, that is, that it was
dealing, from the beginning to the end, with a ne·
gotiable instrument, whereas, in fact, it was not
8

dealing with a negotiable instrument since the
check's negotiability had been destroyed.
The rule is that, where one of the co-payees fails
to endorse, the negotiability of the checks is completely destroyed, and, in honoring such a check, the
holders acquired only the interest of an assignee of
a non-negotiable instrument - that is the interest
of the endorsing payee. Here, Tracy-Collins acquired the interest of Olympus, the endorsing payee; yet,
notwithstanding, the Court has deprived Tracy-Collins of Olympus' interest in the check and that in
view of the fact that Olympus received from TracyCollins the face amount of the check, including Pacific Metals' interest, if any.
In support of Tracy-Collins contention that the
non-endorsing payee, Pacific Metals, could only recover to the extent of its interest or ownership in
the funds represented by the check, in our brief,
the Court's attention was directed to a Colorado case
and two decision of this Court, and although we believe the Utah cases are in point, we will discuss
only the Colorado case, which the Court cited, with
approval, in both its majority and minority opinions,
since it deals specifically with the rights of nonendorsing payees and the extent of a collecting and
a drawee Bank's liability in honoring such a check.
The Colorado Court in American National
Bank of Denver vs. First National Bank, 130 Colorado 557, 277 Pacific 2d 951 (1954) was con9

fronted with the same problem we have here, exce~t
that the maker sued the Drawee Bank and the
Drawee then sued the Collecting Bank. In holding
for the maker and Drawee Bank, the Court limited
the maker's and Drawee Bank's right of recovery to
the amount of non-endorsing payee's ownership in
the funds represented by the check. It further held
the check's negotiability had been destroyed because
of non-endorsement and that the Collecting and
Drawee Banks acquired the interest of the endorsing
co-payee as an assignee only, and that each of the
co-payees' interest in the check was to be determined
by the Trial Court. The Court said :

I
\I

I

"We understand that by our 'Negotiable
Instruments Law' we adopt the common-law
rule providing that where a check is payable
to the order of two or more persons who are
not partners, all of them must endorse unless
the ones so doing has authority to endorse for
the other payees, and this joint endorsement
is necessary for a complete negotiation. Under
the common law, as well as by our 'Negotiable
Instruments Law', where one of the payees
fails to endorse, the negotiability of the check
is completely destroyed. Mills v. Pope, 90
Mont. 569, 4 P. 2d 485; Rosecky v. Tomaszew·
ski, 225 Wis. 438, 27 4 N.W. 259; Bonuso v.
Shroyer Loan & Finance Co., Inc., D.C. Mun.
App., 37 A. 2d 760; Newton County Bank v. ,
Holdeman, 223 Mo. App. 164, 9 S.W. 2d 852. ·
The holder of the check, after this failure to
endorse, acquires the interest of an assignde
only, and as such his interest in the procee s
of the check are to be determined.
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"We conclude that when defendant Hereford, being charged with the absolute and
specific duty of determining that the payees
in the check endorsed the same if it was to
become a holder in due course, neglected so to
do, and accepted the check with the endorsement of Frontier Motor Co. only thereon, it
acquired only such interest in the check a.s
Frontier Motor Co. had therein. Hereford acquired an assignment of Frontier's interest in
the check and could not, without the endorsement of the co-payee, transfer title thereto as
a negotiable instrument. At best Hereford
acquired an interest in a nor1rnegotiable chose
in action." (emphasis added)
And again the Court said :
"We have hereinbefore determined that
the check in question never was negotiated.
It was, in fact, a non-negotiable chose in action; no Bank through which it was channelea
became a holder in due course, and their liability as endorsees is not to be measured by
our ~'Negotiable Instruments Law", but rather with those rights arising out of an assignment of a non-negotiable instrument. At
best, Hereford was entitled to retain only the
financial interest that Frontier Motor Co. had
in the check in question. (emphasis added.)
The Herford (Bank) was the Collecting Bank
and was sued by the Drawee Bank, and the Court
will particularly note that Hereford was entitled
to retain the interest the endorsing payee had in the
check.
The above case, we submit, lays down the prop11

er extent of recovery to an non-endorsing payee and
is in keeping with the well-recognized rule that in
conversion, the prevailing party can recover, only
that amount necessary to compensate him for his
actual pecuniary loss.
To permit a non-endorsing payee to recover
more than his actual financial interest in the funds
represented by a check not only violates the rule of
compensatory damages for mistaken and unintentional conversion, but opens the door for fraud and
collusion.
In the case of State Bank of Southern Utah vs.
Stallings Utah 2nd 146, 427 Pac. 2nd 744, to which
the Court's a tten ti on was called by the Respondent
Bank of Salt Lake, this Court held that, in the absence of an assignment, a check in and of itself did
not effect an assignment of the funds represented
by the check. In this case, the record is clear that
there was no assignment by Olympus to Pacific
Metals either in whole or in part of the funds repre·
sented by the check. Olympus had no claim against
Tracy-Collins, and as to what portion of the funds
represented by the check Pacific Metals was entitled
to receive was to be determined by future negotia·
tions between the co-payees after delivery. It is sub·
mitted that it cannot be determined what interest, if
any, Pacific Metals had in the funds represented by
the check. In this respect, it should be kept in mind
that Olympus did not part with the control of either
the funds represented by the check or the check it·
12

self, and that in the past the checks were delivered
t-0 Olympus by the maker. In this respoct, the Court,
at page 746 in the State Bank of Southern Utah case
quoted with approval a decision of the Supreme
Court of the State of Washington as follows:
"In order to work an equitable assignment there must be an aboslute appropriation
by the assignor of the debt or fund sought to
be assigned to the use of the assignee. The
intention of the assignor must be to transfer
a present interest in the debt or fund or subject matter; if this is done the transaction is
an assignment; otherwise not. 5 C.J. 909.
"The assignor of a chose in action must
part with the power of control over the thing
assigned; if he retains control, it is fatal to
the claim of the assignee, 5 C.J. 912. See, also,
Hossack v. Graham, 20 Wash. 184, 55 P. 26."
CONCLUSION
The Colorado Court's decision, we submit, lays
down the correct rule as to the extent of recovery
for a non-endorsing payee in line with the wellrecognized rule as to damages for conversion; namely, that a non-endorsing payee's right of recovery
is limited to its actual financial interest in the funds
represented by the check.
To hold otherwise is to promulgate a rule of
damages for conversion contrary to that of all the
authorities who have ruled on the question, including this Court's prior decisions, and the decision will
be cited for the proposition that a collecting or
13

drawee bank or either of them are subject to an abso.
lute liability to a non-endorsing co-payee for the
face amount of the check regardless of its interest
therein, even though it owns only a small fraction
of the proceeds represented by the check. It changes
the rule of compensatory damages for conversion
resulting from a mistake or unintentional act.
For the reasons, stated, we urge that the Court
should, and we believe that it will want to re-consider its decision and order a re-hearing and grant the
relief sought by appellant, Tracy-Collins, on its appeal.
Respectfully Submitted,
FRED L. FINLINSON,
L. DELOS DAINES
Attorneys for the Appellant
Tracy-Collins Bank & Trust Co.
822 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City Utah 84101
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